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Abstract
This paper develops a new technique for proving the existence of monetary equilibria in money
search models. In money search models with divisible money, the set of equilibria, if it exists, is at
least one-dimensional. We develop a method to prove the existence of such a set in a fairly simple
way. That is, we ﬁrst ﬁnd an endpoint of the set of equilibria and then we prove the existence of
a continuum of the set of equilibria from this endpoint. Solving for these equilibria is complicated
otherwise than using our method. Thus, our technique is simple but very powerful. Further,
we consider a rather complicated bargaining procedure that allows us to prove the existence of
equilibria in money search model with perfectly divisible goods and money.
Keywords: Real Indeterminacy, Matching Model, Money, Existence of Monetary Equilibria.
Journal of Economic Literature Classiﬁcation Number: C78, D51, D83, E40.
1 Introduction
In order to prove the existence of equilibria, ﬁxed point theorems have usually been used
in both game theory and general equilibrium theory; for example, the existence of Nash
equilibria can be directly proved by Kakutani’s ﬁxed point theorem and, converting the
equilibrium conditions into a mapping from a compact set to itself, the existence of
general equilibrium prices follows from Brouwer’s or Kakutani’s ﬁxed point theorem.
As contrasted with these theories, ﬁxed point theorem has seldom been used in money
search models, because we cannot discern whether the equilibrium is monetary or
non-monetary.1 Non-monetary equilibrium is the equilibrium without monetary trades
and always exists in such models. What we show in this paper is the existence of
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1Notable exceptions are Aiyagari and Wallace [1] and Zhu [13], [14].
1the equilibrium with monetary trade, so called, “monetary equilibrium.” Of course,
some sophisticated technique would prevent ﬁnding a non-monetary equilibrium even
when ﬁxed point theorems are used. However, even with such a technique, equilibrium
strategies cannot explicitly be found.
Therefore, instead of using ﬁxed point theorems, the existence of monetary equilibria
has typically been proved by explicitly ﬁnding a equilibrium strategy in which monetary
trades occur. (See, for example, Kiyotaki and Wright [9], Trejos and Wright [11], and
Green and Zhou [4].) That is, we ﬁrst guess the strategy of a monetary equilibrium
and, then verify the incentive condition. More precisely, ﬁrst we pick a strategy in
which monetary trades occur, second we solve the Bellman equation corresponding to
the strategy, and ﬁnally, given the value function obtained in the second step, we check
the incentive to play the strategy.
In early papers, such as Kiyotaki and Wright [9], both goods and money are assumed
to be indivisible and an agent is assumed to be able to hold at most one unit of
them. Thus it is not very diﬃcult to use the above method of “guess and verify.” By
the assumptions, the equilibrium price, if it exists, is trivially unity in these models.
Subsequently, relaxing these assumptions, Shi [10], Trejos and Wright [11] and Green
and Zhou [4] present models in which equilibrium prices are endogenously determined.
However, they make much eﬀort at solving the Bellman equations, since these equations
have quite complicated structure.2
It is known that in money search models with divisible money there exists a contin-
uum of monetary equilibria. More precisely, the equilibrium has the property of one
degree of freedom. Moreover, there typically exist equilibria in which most of agents
do not have money while a few agents have large amounts of money, and in the limit of
such equilibria, no agents has money. Note that the limit point is not an equilibrium,
since the total amount of money is zero while the exogenously given amount of money
is positive. Note that any point close to the limit point can be an equilibrium. For the
details, see Sections 2, 3, and 4.
By fully exploiting the above property, we present a new technique for proving the
existence of equilibria in money search models with divisible money. Suppose there is
a money search model where the existence of equilibrium has not been proved. Let us
pick the point where no agent has any money. This could be the endpoint of the set
of equilibria. Since the Bellman equation is typically quite simple at the point, then
2Kamiya and Sato [7] ﬁnd a dual-price equilibrium in Green and Zhou’s model. To obtain the equilibrium, they
analyze a quite complicated ﬁfth order polynomial equations.
2it is easy to obtain a solution with a positive value of money, if it exists. In showing
the regularity at the solution and applying the implicit function theorem, it can be
extended to solutions in which some agents has money.
Zhu [14] shows the existence of equilibria in a divisible money version of Camera
and Corbae [3]’s model. In the paper, since a ﬁxed point theorem is indirectly used, the
equilibrium strategy cannot be explicitly found. Moreover, quite complicated nature of
the technique seems to limit the applicability to other models. Our technique is simple
but very powerful; our technique is suﬃciently general to apply to quite complicated
models, and equilibrium strategies are always explicitly found. Indeed, in Section 3, we
show the existence of stationary equilibrium in a new model, where both money and
goods are perfectly divisible, and the bargaining procedure is rather complicated.
The plan of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we present a simple model and
explain the technique. Then in Section 3, we apply it to a new model with divisible
money and divisible goods, and in Section 4 we discuss our technique in general. In
Section 5, we conclude the paper with some discussion.
2 A Simple Example
We ﬁrst investigate a simple model, which can be considered as a simpliﬁed version
of Zhou [12]’s model. We ﬁrst ﬁnd an endpoint of the set of equilibria, and then we
show the existence of the following set of equilibria from this endpoint. We adopt this
model because it has a simple and typical structure of the set of equilibria, although
the existence of monetary equilibria can be directly obtained.
There is a continuum of agents with a mass of measure one. There are k types
of agents with equal fractions and the same number of types of goods. Let κ be the
reciprocal of k.A t y p ei − 1 agent can produce just one unit of type i good and the
production cost is c>0. (We assume that a type k agent produces type 1 good.) A
type i agent obtains utility u>conly when she consumes one unit of type i good. Time
is continuous and pairwise random matchings take place according to Poisson process
with parameter µ>0. For every matched pair, the seller posts a take-it-or-leave-it
price oﬀer without knowing the amount of the buyer’s money holdings. Let M>0b e
the nominal stock of ﬁat money, and γ>0 is a discount rate.
The conditions for a stationary equilibrium are (i) each agent maximizes the ex-
pected value of utility-streams, i.e., the Bellman equation is satisﬁed, (ii) the money
holdings distribution of the economy is stationary, i.e., time-invariant, and (iii) the
3total amount of money the agents have is equal to M. Since the rigorous deﬁnition is
rather complicated, then, instead, we present the conditions for stationary equilibria
with a speciﬁc strategy.
In what follows, we focus on a stationary distribution of money holdings of the
agents with the support {0,p} for some p>0. For simplicity, we assume that money
holdings of the agents are in [0,2p).3 Thus the money holdings distribution can be
expressed by hn for n =0 ,1, the measure of the set of agents with money holding np.
Of course, h must satisfy
h0 + h1 =1 , (1)
hn ≥ 0,n =0 ,1. (2)
We focus on the equilibrium with the following strategy:
• a seller with money holding η ∈ [0,p) oﬀers p,
• a seller with money holding η ∈ [p,2p) chooses no trade, and
• a buyer with money holding η accepts oﬀer prices less than or equal to η.
According to the strategy speciﬁed above, a type i agent without money makes a
sale when she meets a type i + 1 agent with money. The measure of agents with 0 is
h0 and the probability that they can make a sale is µκh1, and thus the set of agents
with measure µκh0h1 moves out from 0, i.e., it is an outﬂow at 0 as well as an inﬂow at
p. On the other hand, a type i agent with p makes a purchase when she meets a type
i − 1 agent without money. The probability that they can make a purchase is µκh0,
and thus the set of agents with measure µκh1h0 moves out from p, i.e., it is an outﬂow
at p as well as an inﬂow at 0. The stationary condition for h =( h0,h 1) requires that
the time rate of inﬂow should be equal to the time rate of outﬂow at n = 0 and n =1 .
Both conditions are the same and expressed as follows:
µκh0h1 = µκh0h1.
This is clearly an identity, and therefore any h satisfying (1) and (2) can be a stationary
distribution. On the other hand, p is determined by
M = ph1. (3)
3Without this assumption, we can prove a similar result. See Zhou [12] and Kamiya et al. [6].
4Let the value function be denoted by V : R+ → R. Next, we consider the values at
{0,p}. We denote the value at np by Vn, i.e., Vn = V(np), then the Bellman equation
is as follows:
G0 = V0 −
1
φ +2
[h1 (V1 − c)+h0V0 + V0]=0 , (4)
G1 = V1 −
1
φ +2
[V1 + h0 (u + V0)+h1V1]=0 , (5)
where φ =
γ
µκ.
The incentive conditions to play the strategy in (4) and (5) are as follows:
− c + V1 ≥ V0, (6)
u + V0 ≥ V1. (7)
The ﬁrst inequality is the condition that an agent with no money has incentive to sell
her production good. The second inequality is the condition that an agent with p has
incentive to accept an oﬀer price p. Note that deﬁning V(η)=V η/p  the incentive
conditions at the other η follow from the above conditions, where  n  is the largest
integer less than or equal to n. (See Zhou [12].) We should also note that the Bellman
equation at η/ ∈ (0,p)∪(p,2p) is satisﬁed. Therefore a stationary monetary equilibrium,
in which all agents choose the strategy described above, is deﬁned as (h0,h 1,V 0,V 1,p)
satisfying (1)-(7). Note that
Remark 1 We should also check the incentive for agents not to oﬀer non-integer mul-
tiple of p. Since we deﬁned V(η)=V η/p , it is clearly satisﬁed. (See also Zhou [12].)
Note that similar arguments apply to a general model. See Remark 3 in Section 4.
The ﬁrst step in our technique is to ﬁnd a point at h0 = 1 satisfying all conditions
except (3). The Bellman equation at the point is as follows:
V0 −
1
φ +2
[V0 + V0]=0 ,
V1 −
1
φ +2
[V1 +( u + V0)] = 0.
Since this system of equation is much simpler than (4) and (5), the solution is easily
obtained as V0 =0 ,V1 = 1
φ+1u.
Next, we check if this value function satisﬁes the equilibrium conditions except (3)
at (h0,h 1)=( 1 ,0). Clearly, (7) is satisﬁed with strict inequality for any u and φ. The
5necessary and suﬃcient condition for (6) is
φ +1≤
u
c
. (8)
In what follows, we assume that (8) holds with strict inequality.
Clearly, this solution does not satisfy (3) for any p>0. Then the last step of
our technique is to slightly extend the point so that (3) is satisﬁed. To be more
precise, we ﬁnd (h0,h 1)=( 1− , ) and corresponding (V0,V 1) satisfying all conditions
for stationary equilibrium for a suﬃciently small  >0. Clearly, (3) is satisﬁed for
p =
M
  > 0. To ﬁnd such a point, we can simply apply the implicit function theorem.
More precisely, the regularity of the system of equations (4) and (5) at h0 =1i s
satisﬁed as follows:
det
 ∂G0
∂V0
∂G0
∂V1
∂G1
∂V0
∂G1
∂V1
 
h0=1
= det
 
1 −
1
φ+2(1 + h0) −
1
φ+2(1 − h0)
− 1
φ+2h0 1 − 1
φ+2(2 − h0)
 
h0=1
= det
 
φ
φ+2 0
− 1
φ+2
φ+1
φ+2
 
 =0 .
Then, by the implicit function theorem, (V0,V 1) satisfying (4) and (5) can be written
as C1 functions of  ,( V0( ),V 1( )). It remains to show that this solution satisﬁes the
incentive condition (6). Because (8) is satisﬁed with strict inequality, this condition
is still satisﬁed for a suﬃciently small  >0. This concludes that (h0,h 1,V 0,V 1,p)=
(1 −  , ,V0( ),V 1( ),
M
  ) is a stationary monetary equilibrium for a suﬃciently small
 >0.
Note that the point at h0 = 1 is not a “non-monetary” equilibrium, since ﬁat money
has positive value, i.e., V1 > 0. In other words, agents have incentive to use money if
they have.
Simple systems of inequalities as considered above can be solved directly, but in
the cases where the models are more complex, the system may not be solved directly.
However, our technique is applicable to complicated models as we show in Section 3.
3 A Model with Divisible Goods
In this section, we apply our method to a new model. We adopt the same environment
as the previous section besides the following three environments:
6(i) We assume that money holdings of the agents are in [0,(N+1)p) for some positive
integer N, where N is exogenously given. Thus money holdings distributions have the
support {0,p,...,Np}.
(ii) We assume that commodity goods are perfectly divisible. Let C(q)=q be the
cost function and U(q)=q
1
2 be the utility function.
(iii) When a type i agent (i.e. a seller of good i + 1) meets a type i + 1 agent (a
buyer of good i + 1), one of the following events occurs: (1) with probability
1
2, the
former can make a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer (ds,q s), a pair of an amount of ﬁat money
and a quantity of good, (2) with probability
1
2, the latter can make a take-it-or-leave-it
oﬀer (db,q b). Moreover, we assume that an agent can observe the type and the current
money holdings of the matched agent at the beginning of the bargaining.
We search for a monetary equilibrium in which there exists p>0 such that
• a seller with money holding η<N palways oﬀers (p,qs) for some qs > 0. The
oﬀer is accepted by any buyer with money holdings more than or equal to p,
• a seller with money holding η ≥ Np oﬀers no trade, and
• a buyer with money holding more than or equal to p always oﬀers (p,qb) for some
qb > 0. The oﬀer is accepted by any seller with money holdings less than Np.
Although the oﬀ-equilibrium strategy is not completely speciﬁed in the above, it will
be determined by the value function. Note that the above is suﬃcient for ﬁnding the
equilibrium value function. Then the stationary condition for h =( h0,h 1,...,h N)i s
N  
n=0
hn − 1=0 , (9)
µκ[h1(1 − hN) − h0(1 − h0)] = 0, (10)
µκ[{hn−1(1 − h0)+hn+1(1 − hN)}−hn{(1 − h0)+( 1− hN)}]=0 , 1 ≤ n ≤ N − 1,
(11)
µκ[hN−1(1 − h0) − hN(1 − hN)] = 0. (12)
Note that (10), (11), and (12) correspond to the stationarity at n =0 ,n =1 ,...,N−1,
and n = N, respectively. As in the previous section, it is easily veriﬁed that two
equations among them are redundant. Thus in what follows we focus on (9) and (11).
7Let
F0 =
N  
n=0
hn − 1=0 ,
Fn = {hn−1(1 − h0)+hn+1(1 − hN)}−hn {(1 − h0)+( 1− hN)} =0 , 1 ≤ n ≤ N − 1.
Then we obtain the following stationary distribution from the stationary condition:
hn = h0
 
1 − h0
1 − hN
 n
,n =1 ,...,N, (13)
where hN is determined so that
hN(1 − hN)
N = h0(1 − h0)
N. (14)
Clearly, for any h0 ∈ [0,1], there exist h1,...,h N ∈ [0,1] satisfying (13) and (14). In
other words, for any h0 ∈ [0,1], there is the corresponding distribution h satisfying the
stationary condition.
Next, by the barging procedure, on the equilibrium path, a seller oﬀers (p,qn
s)t o
the matched buyer with np, where qn
s satisﬁes
U(q
n
s)=Vn − Vn−1. (15)
Similarly, a buyer bids (p,qn
b ) to the matched seller with np, where qn
b satisﬁes
C(q
n
b)=Vn+1 − Vn. (16)
Then the Bellman equation can be written as follows:
G0 = V0 −
1
φ +2
 
1
2
N  
n =1
hn (V1 − C(q
n 
s )) +
1
2
h0V0 +
1
2
V0 + V0
 
=0 ,
Gn = Vn −
1
φ +2
 
1
2
N  
n =1
hn (Vn+1 − C(q
n 
s )) +
1
2
h0Vn
+
1
2
Vn +
1
2
N−1  
n =0
hn (Vn−1 + U(q
n 
b )) +
1
2
hNVn +
1
2
Vn
 
=0 ,n =1 ,...,N− 1,
GN = VN −
1
φ +2
 
VN +
1
2
N−1  
n =0
hn (VN−1 + U(q
n 
b )) +
1
2
hNVN +
1
2
VN
 
=0 .
As in the previous section, we investigate a solution at h0 = 1. First, from (13) and
(14), h0 = 1 implies h1 = ··· = hN = 0. Then, using (16), the Bellman equation is
8written as follows:
G0 = V0 −
1
φ +2
 
1
2
V0 +
1
2
V0 + V0
 
=0 ,
Gn = Vn −
1
φ +2
 
1
2
Vn +
1
2
Vn +
1
2
[Vn−1 + U(V1 − V0)] +
1
2
Vn
 
=0 ,n =1 ,...,N− 1,
GN = VN −
1
φ +2
 
VN +
1
2
[VN−1 + U(V1 − V0)] +
1
2
VN
 
=0 .
we obtain q0
b = A2, V0 = 0, and
Vn = A
2
n−1  
k=0
A
k,n =1 ,...,N, (17)
where A =
 
1
2φ+1
 
.4 Let y∗ =( h0,···,h N,V 0,···,V N).
In this paper, we only investigate the case N = 2. Let
y
∗ =
 
(1,0,0),
 
0,A
2,A
2(1 + A)
  
.
Let Ψ : R3 × R3 → R2 × R3 be deﬁned as
Ψ((h0,h 1,h 2),(V0,V 1,V 2)) = (F0,F 1,G 0,G 1,G 2)(h0,h 1,h 2,V 0,V 1,V 2).
Let y =( h,V ) and denote by detDΨ(y) the Jacobian of Ψ with respect to
(h1,h 2,V 0,V 1,V 2)a ty. Then the next step is to verify that detDΨ(y∗)  =0a ty∗.
Indeed, detDΨ(y∗) is calculated as follows:
detDΨ(y
∗) = det
 
Υ1 0
Υ2 Υ3
 
,
where
detΥ1 = det
⎛
⎝
11 1
−110
0 −11
⎞
⎠
=3 ,
and
detΥ3 = det
⎛
⎜
⎝
−
φ
φ+2 00
−
1
φ+2 −
1
4A
φ+1
φ+2 +
1
4A 0
− 1
2(φ+2) − 1
4A − 1
2(φ+2) + 1
4A −
φ+1
φ+2
⎞
⎟
⎠
=
φ(φ +1 )
(φ +2 ) 2
 
φ +1
φ +2
+
1
4A
 
.
4The other solution is q0
b = 0 and Vn =0 ,n=0 ,...,N.
9Then detDΨ(y∗)  = 0. By the implicit function theorem, a solution to Ψ(y)=0
can be written as a C1 function of  >0, where h0 =1 −  . Note that, it
follows from (13) that, for a suﬃciently small  >0, the corresponding y( )=
((1 −  ,h1( ),h 2( )),(V0( ),V 1( ),V 2( ))) satisﬁes h1( ) > 0 and h2( ) > 0.
Next, we verify that all the incentive conditions are satisﬁed at h0 = 1 with strict
inequalities. It follows that, for a suﬃciently small  >0, the corresponding y( )
satisﬁes the incentive conditions.
In case of N = 2, the relevant incentive conditions are as follows:
(a) incentive for a buyer with ip to oﬀer p to a seller with jp, where i =1 ,2 and
j =0 ,1,
(b) incentive for a buyer with 2p to oﬀer p to a seller with 0,
(c) incentive for a seller with ip to oﬀer p to a buyer with jp, where i =0 ,1 and
j =1 ,2,
(d) incentive for a seller with 0 to oﬀer p to a buyer with 2p.
Remark 2 As in the model in the previous section, deﬁning V(η)=V η/p  for η ∈
(0,p) ∪ (p,2p), we should show (i) the incentive not to oﬀer a noninteger multiple of
p, (ii) the incentive to take the strategy at η ∈ (0,p) ∪ (p,2p), which is only partially
speciﬁed in the above, and (iii) the Bellman equation is satisﬁed at η ∈ (0,p)∪(p,2p).
(i) clearly follows from the above incentive conditions and the deﬁnition of V. (ii) and
(iii) are also easily follow from them.
For example, consider an agent with money holdings 1.5p. Suppose she is a buyer
and makes an oﬀer to a seller with η. Her optimal oﬀer is determined by
max
(d,q)
U(q)+V(1.5p − d)
s.t.C(q)=V(η + d) −V(η)
η + d<3p, 0 ≤ d ≤ 1.5p.
On the equilibrium path, the money holdings of the sellers are either 0,p,o r2 p.T h u sw e
should investigate the cases of η =0 ,p,2p in order to check the Bellman equation. We
investigate the incentive for her to oﬀer p instead of ˜ d ∈ (0,p). Let q(pb,k) be the quantity
of the commodity good such that the seller with kp is indiﬀerent between accepting
10(pb,q (pb,k)) and rejecting it. Then, since V is a step function, q(˜ d,k) is determined by
q(˜ d,k) = V
 
kp+ ˜ d
 
−V(kp)=Vk − Vk =0 .
Thus oﬀering ˜ d is not better than no trade. Similarly, an oﬀer price ˜ d ∈ (p,1.5p) is not
better than p. Therefore, we need to show that she prefers oﬀering p to no trade, i.e.,
U
 
q(p,k)
 
+ V0 ≥ V1. (18)
(18) is the same as the condition that a buyer with p prefers oﬀering p to no trade.
Clearly, (18) is a special case of (a). Similar arguments apply to the case that the agent
with 1.5p is a buyer, to the case that her partner oﬀers, and to the case that she is
a seller. Thus the Bellman equation at 1.5p is the same as that at p. Of course, this
argument applies to agents with any money holdings.
Note that similar arguments apply to a general model. See Remark 3 in Section 4.
As for (a), the strict incentive condition is
u(Vi+j − Vj)+Vi−1 − Vi > 0.
Since
u(Vi+j − Vj)+Vi−1 − Vi = A
1+.5j  
1 − A
i−.5j 
≥ A
1+.5j  
1 − A
.5 
,
the strict incentive is always satisﬁed.
As for (b), the strict incentive condition is
u(V1 − V0)+V1 − u(V2 − V0)+V0 > 0.
Thus by (a), a suﬃcient condition is
V2 − u(V2 − V0)+V0 > 0.
Clearly,
V2 − u(V2 − V0)+V0 = A
2(1 + A)
 
1 −
1
A(1 + A).5
 
is strictly positive when A is suﬃciently close 1, i.e., φ is suﬃciently small. Then the
strict incentive condition is satisﬁed for a suﬃciently small φ.
11Similarly, we can verify that (c) and (d) hold for a suﬃciently small φ. In other
words, for a suﬃciently small φ, y( ) is a monetary equilibrium when   is suﬃciently
small.
For N>2, similar arguments can be applied. However, the incentive at h0 =1i s
not strict in some cases. Thus we need to choose strategies which the agents prefer
even for h0 =1−  .
4 The Technique in a General Model
In this section we extend our technique to more general environment. The model we
consider in this section is similar to one in Kamiya and Shimizu [8]. (In what follows,
we call KS.)
4.1 A General Model
There is a continuum of agents with a mass of measure one. There are k ≥ 3 types
of agents with equal fractions and the same number of types of goods. Let κ be the
reciprocal of k.At y p ei good is produced by a type i−1 agent. A type i agent obtains
some positive utility only when she consumes type i good. We make no assumption on
the divisibility of goods. We assume that ﬁat money is durable and perfectly divisible.
Time is continuous, and pairwise random matchings take place according to Poisson
process with parameter µ>0.
We conﬁne our attention to the case that, for some positive number p, all trades
occur with its integer multiple amounts of money. In what follows, we focus on a
stationary distribution of economy-wide money holdings on {0,...,N} expressed by
h =( h0,...,h N), where hn is the measure of agents with np amount of money, and N<
∞ is the upper bound of the distribution. Our model includes the case of exogenously
determined N as well as the case of endogenously determined N. Of course, hn ≥ 0
and
 N
n=0 hn = 1 hold. Let M>0 be a given nominal stock of money. Since p is
uniquely determined by
 N
n=0pnhn = M for a given h for h0  = 1, then, deleting p from
{0,p,...,Np}, the set {0,...,N} can be considered as the state space.
Since we adopt a general framework, various types of bargaining procedures are
allowed.5 An agent with n, or an agent with np amount of money, chooses an action
in An = {an1,...,a nsn}. Let A =Π N
n=0An. For example, an action consists of an
5See Subsection 3 for the details.
12oﬀer price and a reservation price. Throughout the paper, we conﬁne our attention
to the stationary equilibrium in which all agents choose pure strategies. As for mixed
strategy equilibrium, see KS. Let S =
 N
n=0 sn. Given an equilibrium action proﬁle
a =( a0,...,a N), where an is the action taken at np in the equilibrium, deﬁne α(a)=
{(n,j) | an = anj}.
The monetary transition resulted from transaction among a matched pair is de-
scribed by a function f. When an agent with money holdings np and action anj meets
an agent with n p and an j , their states, i.e., money holdings, become (n+f(n,j;n ,j ))p
and (n  −f(n,j;n ,j ))p, respectively. That is f maps an ordered pair (n,j;n ,j )t oa
non-negative integer f(n,j;n ,j ). Here “ordered” means, for example, that the former
is a seller and the latter is a buyer. When N is exogenously determined, we assume
N ≥ n + f(n,j;n
 ,j
 ) and n
  − f(n,j;n
 ,j
 ) ≥ 0.
When N is endogenously determined, we assume the latter condition while the former
one should be satisﬁed on the equilibrium path.
Let θ ∈ RL be the parameters of the model.
We adopt Bellman equation approach. Let Vn be the value of state n, n =0 ,...,N.
The variables in the model are denoted by x =( h,V,a). Let Wnj(x;θ) be the value of
action j at state n. Thus, in equilibria, Wnj(x;θ)=Vn holds for (n,j) ∈ α(a). Note
that Wnj(x;θ) includes the utility and/or the production cost of perishable goods.
4.2 A Property of the Stationary Condition
We deﬁne
hnj =
 
hn if anj = an,
0i f anj  = an.
Then by the random matching assumption and the deﬁnition of f, the inﬂow In into
state n and the outﬂow On from state n are deﬁned as follows:
In(h,a;θ)=µκ
⎡
⎣
 
(i,j,i ,j )∈Xn
hijhi j  +
 
(i,j,i ,j )∈X 
n
hijhi j 
⎤
⎦,
On(h,a;θ)=µκ
⎡
⎣
 
(j,i ,j )∈Yn
hnjhi j  +
 
(j,i ,j )∈Y  
n
hnjhi j 
⎤
⎦,
13where
Xn = {(i,j,i
 ,j
 ) | f(i,j;i
 ,j
 ) > 0,i + f(i,j;i
 ,j
 )=n},
X
 
n = {(i,j,i
 ,j
 ) | f(i,j,i
 ,j
 ) > 0,i
  − f(i,j;i
 ,j
 )=n},
Yn = {(j,i
 ,j
 ) | f(n,j;i
 ,j
 ) > 0},
Y
 
n = {(j,i
 ,j
 ) | f(i
 ,j
 ;n,j) > 0}.
We denote In−On by Dn. Then the condition for stationarity is Dn = 0 for n =0 ,...,N
and
 N
n=0hn = 1. Clearly,
 N
n=0 Dn = 0 holds as an identity, and thus at least one
equation is redundant. The following theorem shows that one more equation is always
redundant.
Theorem 1 (Kamiya and Shimizu [8]) For any a,
N  
n=0
nDn(h,a;θ)=0 , (19)
is an identity.
Suppose that two agents, say a buyer and a seller, meet and a monetary trade
occurs. Then the amount of money the buyer pays is equal to that of the seller obtains;
in other words, the amount of money before trade is equal to that of after trade.
Since this holds in each trade, the total amount of money before trades, expressed by
 N
n=0 pnOn(h,a;θ), is equal to the total amount of money after trades, expressed by
 N
n=0 pnIn(h,a;θ), and thus
 N
n=0 nDn(h,a;θ) = 0 always holds.
Together with the other identity
 N
n=0 Dn(h,a) = 0, the above theorem implies
that h is a stationary distribution if and only if Dn(h,a;θ)=0 ,n =2 ,...,N, and
 N
n=0 hn = 1 hold. Namely, the condition for stationarity has at least one-degree of
freedom. This is the main cause of the indeterminacy.
Now the equilibrium condition is expressed as follows:
Deﬁnition 1 Given θ, x =( h,V,a) ∈ RN+1×R
N+1
+ ×A is a (pure strategy) stationary
14equilibrium if it satisﬁes the following:
h0  =1 , (20)
N  
n=0
hn − 1=0 , (21)
Dn(h,a;θ)=0 ,n =1 ,...,N− 1 (22)
Vn − Wnj(x;θ)=0 , (n,j) ∈ α(a) (23)
Vn − Wnj(x;θ) ≥ 0, (n,j) / ∈ α(a). (24)
(h,V ) is called a stationary equilibrium for a and θ if (h,V,a) is a stationary equilibrium
for θ. A stationary equilibrium is called a monetary equilibrium if Vn−V0 > 0 for some
n>0.
(20) is required for the existence of p>0 satisfying
N  
n=0
pnhn = M. (25)
(21)-(22) is the stationary condition. Note that, because of Theorem 1, the stationary
conditions at n = 1 and N are dropped. (23) is the condition that the equilibrium
strategy indeed realizes the value. (24) is the relevant incentive condition.6 We deﬁne
F0 =
N  
n=0
hn − 1,
Fn = Dn(h,a;θ),n =1 ,...,N− 1
Gn = Vn − Wnj(x;θ), (n,j) ∈ α(a)
Remark 3 In addition to the above equilibrium conditions, the following conditions
are typically required to be an “equilibrium” in most of matching models with money:
(i) the incentive not to choose an action out of our action space,7 and (ii) the incentive
to take the equilibrium strategy at state η/ ∈{ 0,p,...,Np}. However, they are not
very restrictive, for KS presents a suﬃcient condition to assure that (i) and (ii) hold,
and it is satisﬁed in all of the matching models with divisible money known so far, such
as Zhou [12]’s model, a divisible money version of Camera and Corbae [3]’s model, and
6For the other incentive conditions, see the discussion in Subsection 3.
7For example in Section 3, a seller may oﬀer a price which is not an integer multiple of p.
15a divisible money version of Trejos and Wright [11]’s model, as well as the models in
Section 2 and 3.
4.3 The Technique
KS shows that there is real indeterminacy of stationary equilibria under some global
regularity conditions which restrict the global structure of the set of equilibria. In this
paper, we only utilize the local structure of stationary equilibria around h0 =1 .
Given a and θ, let Ψ : RN+1 × RN+1 → RN × RN+1 be deﬁned as
Ψ((h0,...,h N),(V0,...,V N) )=( F0,...,F N−1,G 0,...,G N)(h0,...,h N,V 0,...,V N,a;θ).
Denote by detDΨ(h,V ) the determinant of the following (2N +1)×(2N + 1) matrix:
⎛
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜ ⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎝
∂F0
∂h1(h,V ) ...
∂F0
∂hN(h,V )
∂F0
∂V0(h,V ) ...
∂F0
∂VN(h,V )
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
∂FN−1
∂h1 (h,V ) ...
∂FN−1
∂hN (h,V )
∂FN−1
∂V0 (h,V ) ...
∂FN−1
∂VN (h,V )
∂G0
∂h1(h,V ) ...
∂G0
∂hN(h,V )
∂G0
∂V0 (h,V ) ...
∂G0
∂VN(h,V )
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
∂GN
∂h1 (h,V ) ...
∂GN
∂hN (h,V )
∂GN
∂V0 (h,V ) ...
∂GN
∂VN (h,V )
⎞
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟ ⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎠
.
Then, our technique proceeds by the following steps:
(1) Find a candidate strategy a for a stationary monetary equilibrium.
(2) Setting (h0,h 1,...,h N)=( 1 ,0,...,0), obtain V satisfying (23). Denote (h,V )=
((1,0,...,0),V)b yy∗.
(3) Verify that detDΨ(y∗) is nonzero. Then, by the implicit function theorem, there
are C1 functions (h1( ),...,h N( ),V 0( ),...,V N( )) which, together with h0 =
1 −  , a, and θ, satisﬁes (20)-(23) for a suﬃciently small  >0. Denote y∗( )=
(1 −  ,h1( ),...,h N( ),V 0( ),...,V N( )).
(4) Verify that hn( ) ≥ 0 for n =1 ,2,...,N for suﬃciently small  >0.
(5) Verify the incentive condition (24) for a suﬃciently small  >0.
The advantage of our technique is that it is applicable to various models, since the
Bellman equations are typically simple at h0 =1 .
165 Concluding Remarks
5.1 The Case of Indivisible Money
The above argument can be easily applied to models with indivisible money. Suppose
∆ is the minimum unit of ﬁat money, i.e., the reciprocal of ∆ stands for the degree
of divisibility of money. The set of admissible prices is {0,∆,2∆,...}. From (25),
it follows that among a continuum of stationary money holdings distributions only a
ﬁnite number of them, if any, are in the set. Of course, the smaller ∆ is, the larger
the number of admissible stationary money holdings distributions is. Therefore, for
suﬃciently small ∆, we can ﬁnd stationary equilibrium in the neighborhood of h0 =1 .
5.2 General Structure of Stationary Equilibria
In the above discussion, there exists a one-dimensional manifold, a set of stationary
equilibria, with the endpoint corresponding to h0 = 1. In this case, following the
manifold, we can ﬁnd its whole structure; especially, equilibria with h0 not close to
one can be obtained. For the methods to follow one-dimensional manifolds, see, for
example, Allgower and Georg [2]. See also Herings, Talman and Yang [5]; they present
a method to follow a continuum of price constrained equilibria.
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